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This paper offers a critique of the kind of intellectual frameworks typically used to 
explain creativity in music (for example, the kind of research questions typically 
asked of a student commencing a music project at postgraduate level). These 
questions are typically analytical, say around the conventions of a genre and how 
they can be used to produce new work, but they fail in my view to acknowledge 
creativity as a process, analytical questions being more suitable to assess a finished 
work, not one that hasn’t even started yet, or is in process. The conventional 
academic wisdom is that the “new” is a revoicing or recombining of the familiar, but 
in this formulation, the “new” remains essentially untheorised. I use concepts 
around creativity as novelty from Henri Bergson, such as duration and movement, to 
offer a critique of systems theories of creativity (Toynbee, McIntyre and 
Csikszentmihalyi) that seek to reduce the creative process to a series of “choices” 
between different pre-­­existing creative possibilities. In its place I propose a focus on 
novelty, duration and movement as aspects of creative process. 
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This paper argues that Western thought has struggled with the concept of creativity, 
because of its tendency to see knowledge as the discovery of eternal and changeless 
truths and laws about the world. However, the philosophy of Henri Bergson, partly 
as interpreted by Gilles Deleuze, has “transformed philosophy by posing the 
question of the ‘new’ instead of that of eternity” so that we can ask afresh “how are 
the production and appearance of something new possible?” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 3). 
 
Traditionally creativity was explained as a mysterious force either issuing from 
Nature, the cosmos, a deity, or, in the case of artistic creation, from the intuitive 
“genius” of the human mind. More recently it has been demystified and theorised as 
a mechanism – ranging from materialist accounts of evolution in science to critical 
theoretical reflections on “art” and creativity as the product of complex cultural 
systems. Bergson argues that neither model is adequate, because both assume that 
“all is given” – ie either that there is a final cause or author, or on the other hand 
that the phenomena can be adequately understood as conforming to a set of laws 
that arise from scientific observation (Bergson, 1944, p. 45). What both accounts 
omit, according to Bergson, is time. Time means that all is not given, because we 
don’t know the future, which is both scary (because human knowledge is not 
absolute) and exciting, because it makes novelty possible. Rather than 
understanding the world in terms of fixed, eternal truths, Bergson argues that 
change and difference are primary, and this is one with his insistence on time, or as 
he calls it, duration. This is not clock time, divisible, measurable, linear, predictable, 
spatial, but more like time as experienced, though not reducible to experience, 
rather a way of linking individual consciousness to continuous, indivisible, open-­­ 
ended processes of change. Bergson proposes that creativity is a fundamental life 
process, and that human creativity provides the best means to participate in, if not 
understand, it. Creativity is a differentiating movement in time. 
 
Bergson’s philosophy is built around apparent dualisms, but dualism is his method, 
rather than his end point (Matthews, 1999). His concept of difference is not about 
variations between two terms, or how one term negates the other, rather difference 
is a creative force operating in time to produce multiple varieties of newness (Grosz, 
2005). As we have already seen with difference, Bergson’s philosophy is based on 
paradoxes – for example that the only certainty is change. In paradox, logic collides 
with lived experience: A is not A; identity is not itself, experience taking time into 
account, whereas logic does not (Colie, 1966). He tends to use paradox in two ways – 
the first is to analyse traditional philosophical paradoxes and show how they are 
badly analysed composites – that they mix two different kinds of knowledge – 
intellectual on the one hand, and time-­­based, broadly experiential, or intuitive 
(Deleuze, 1991). This leads to the formulation of a series of paradoxes – that 
questions contain more than answers, that nothing is more than something, that 
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disorder is more than order, that the reality of a work of art precedes its possibility, 
that continuity and heterogeneity, or singularity and multiplicity can co-­­exist, and 
that creativity, far from being an optional add-­­on or culmination of experience, is in 
fact its fundamental generative principle. 
 
 
Bergson's career in philosophy began with the explication of Zeno's paradoxes of 
motion, such as Achilles and the tortoise (1944, pp. 328-­­30). Mathematics tells us 
that because the space between Achilles and the tortoise is infinitely divisible, he will 
never overtake the tortoise. However, Bergson argues that it is mistaken to  
substitute the analysis of the movement for the movement itself -­­  while space may 
be infinitely divisible, movement is continuous and indivisible – if you break a 
movement up into a series of steps, it is no longer the same movement (think of a 
melody).  Moreover, movement takes place in time -­­  we don't actually know when or 
where the movement is going to end, whereas mathematics necessarily treats the 
movement as complete, or at least predictable. The intellect treats movement as a 
series of frozen positions. So the paradox arises from the mixture of two modes of 
knowledge, or the attempt to explain one in terms of the other. The same argument 
can be applied to systems theories’ attempt to explain novelty as the recombination 
of pre-­­existing elements. “If I consider parts… abstractly, I cannot understand the 
movement which goes from one to the other. Imagine I am starving at A and at B 
there is something to eat, when I have reached B and had something to eat, what  
has changed is not only my state, but the state of the whole which encompassed B, A 
and all that was between them” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 8). 
 
 
The systems theory of creativity, as discussed in McIntyre (2006, 2008), 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988), and Toynbee (2000), sets out agents and possibilities in 
various fields, structures or domains and sees creativity as arising from interactions 
between them. I think these theories have important insights in terms of seeing 
creativity as a social process, as “greater” than the individual creator, and in 
emphasising intertextuality – the extent to which new work is a recombination or 
“revoicing” of existing parts. But they fail to understand the experience of creativity, 
or to link that experience to actual creation, to explain how novelty is possible in a 
field where everything is already given, for example why it gave rise to “that” work 
as opposed to another. It is possible to show how grass grows in terms of a complex 
system of interactions between seeds, soil, weather and environment. But no two 
blades of grass are the same and while this might be trivial in some contexts, in an 
artistic or cultural context, the difference, not the similarity, is what excites our 
interest and engagement. I will proceed by problematizing the terminology of 
systems theory, for example “field” and “possibility”. 
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McIntyre, Toynbee and Csikszentmihalyi propose that creativity is an “activity 
whereby products, processes and ideas are generated from antecedent conditions 
by the agency of someone … and the resultant novel variation is seen as a valued 
addition to the store of human knowledge” (McIntyre, 2006, p. 202). That is, there is 
an agent (presumably the artist) and structure, typically split between a formal field 
(in McIntyre a domain of knowledge) and a social or cultural field. In Toynbee the 
split is between a field of production and a field of works. Both theorists use 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to mediate between structure and agent (so that 
agents and structure are continually rewriting each other). Both also note that 
manoeuvring in the field has to do with the acquisition of cultural capital. 
The question arises – how do we know something is novel? McIntyre and 
Csikszentmihalyi’s answer is that the field tells us so. This argument is somewhat 
circular – besides it could just as easily be argued (as Bourdieu does) that novelty is 
actually cultural capital, which isn’t really novelty at all (Bourdieu, 1996). Also, what 
form does this recognition take? Is it critical reception, sales (the answer surely 
depends somewhat on the field)? What about retrospective recognition? What is 
new about the works apart from the fact that they are “recognised” as such? 
Nothing, according to McIntyre: “the information that goes into the creative idea 
existed long before the creative person arrived on the scene” (2008, p. 41). For 
Toynbee it is about the translation or transgression of existing work or ideas. 
Although arguing (correctly) that one of the advantages of the systems model is that 
it does not privilege the creator (creativity can start at any point in the system), 
nevertheless both McIntyre and Toynbee offer a model which places the creator in 
some kind of field from which they “choose” different possibilities, constrained and 
enabled by their habitus and the nature of the field itself. “Producing variations in 
the symbols systems, they make decisions and choices about them. The limitations 
on autonomous decision making are… set by the field and domain, acting as both … 
constraints and enabling factors” (McIntyre, 2008, p. 49). Toynbee talks similarly 
about the “selection of possibles”, his eventual point being that authorship is 
“social”, as in the example of Charles Mingus, because Mingus drew on many 
traditions of African American music (2000, p. 46). But clearly there is a difference 
between analysis of complete body of work and a creative process. One deals with a 
(reasonably) finished body of work, one with a process of becoming. 
 
 
Field is obviously a spatial metaphor, which we fill with ideas, concepts or examples. 
Bergson argues that “the habit of proceeding from emptiness to fullness is the 
source of non-­­existent problems” (1965, p. 113). Rather, he argues for treating 
reality as a fullness from which space is extracted by an act of mind. If we are always 
experiencing something, the experience of nothing (or of space) is a logical 
impossibility, or rather it relates to the human experience of lack – “nothing” is the 
lack of the thing we were looking for. Or as John Cage puts it in relation to musical 
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experience: “there is no such thing as silence” (2011, p. 51). Perception is always 
interested, or, if you like, because we’re always in the field, we never see it as a 
distinct thing, except perhaps in retrospect. But then the creative act is already over. 
To put it another way, perception is action (another paradox), and this is never more 
true than in a creative process. 
 
 
The most radical inversion is that of the possible and the real, and this is the one that 
relates most directly to creativity. Conventionally we think that the possible is less 
than, and precedes the real, which actualises or fills out possibility. But for Bergson it 
is the opposite way round – the reality of a creative work precedes its possibility.  
Like nothing, possibility is an act of mind, so it includes the real plus the mind 
engaging with it. Bergson imagines he is asked to predict what will occur in the field 
of post-­­war drama: “If I knew what was to be the great dramatic work of the future, I 
should be writing it” (1965, p. 118). The creation of a work is what makes it possible. 
The obvious analogy is evolution – while scientists can classify and analyse what has 
already occurred, they can never predict what new forms life will take in the future. 
And so it is, to some degree, with cultural processes as well. In McIntyre’s discussion 
of the Beatles’ “Yesterday” (2006) he explains how interactions of the field, domain 
and agents gave rise to the conditions that allowed “Yesterday” to be written. But 
what can never be explained is why it was that song that was written and not 
another. It’s always possible to explain something in retrospect, but this is to look for 
the mirage of the past in the present. 
 
 
This argument seems pertinent to the explanation of the evolution of music scenes, 
the Dunedin Sound for example. There are two points here – first that many 
accounts often seem to cite the same kind of precedents: isolation, university town, 
possibly inclement weather, a lack of cultural stimulation, a few highly educated 
record collections, perhaps a college radio station – sounds like Dunedin… or Seattle, 
or Athens, Georgia… and so on (McLeay, 1994; Shuker, 1998). The second point is 
that if the Dunedin Sound had not been some kind post-­­punk alternative guitar rock 
but had been another genre like electronica or a ska revival, the same factors would 
be cited. “If the event can always be explained afterwards by an arbitrary choice of 
antecedent events, a completely different event could have been equally well 
explained in the same circumstances by another choice of antecedent – nay, by the 
same antecedents … otherwise perceived” (Bergson, 1965, p. 122). 
 
 
Frith similarly argues against the idea that people create music, which expresses 
their social conditions, emotions, culture etc. A Marxist model might show how a 
“base” produces a particular cultural superstructure, but “the difficult trick is to do 
the analysis the other way round, to show how the base produced this 
superstructure” (1996, p. 109). Rather than identities creating music, music creates 
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identities. It’s “not that social groups agree on values which are then expressed in 
cultural activities … but that they only get to know themselves as a group through 




The idea that there is more in the possible than the real means that the analysis of 
the work as a series of choices always comes after creation. What appear as choices 
retrospectively are not primarily experienced as choices at the time. Would the same 
choices lead to the same work? No, because time has moved on – so the choices 
could not be the same because they would carry with them the weight of experience 
(eg of having previously made these choices). This is like trying to recreate a demo 
that you like because it has a distinctive quality. It never works – you have to remake 
it in a different way. Creativity is not a repeatable process, or rather it can be 
repeated – but it will be different. 
 
 
Part of the problem is that the term “possibility” contains at least two different 
meanings, which such accounts conflate and present as one. There is possibility in 
the sense of “nothing hindering its realisation” – it is possible, though unlikely, that I 
will resign my academic position and become an ice-­­cream vendor next week. This is 
also possibility in the sense of a rational choice, where I can see different courses of 
action and choose one. The idea of “absence of hindrance” has been allowed to 
merge imperceptibly into the idea of ideal pre-­­existence – as if the possible was an 
idea or choice in my mind that I can choose to bring into full existence (Bergson, 
1965, p. 121). Or that possibilities were laid in front of me, as on a table, and I chose 
one. Toynbee comes close to this concept when he describes the radius of creativity 
as an arena of possibles – about which musical agents “made particular decisions at 
particular moments” (2000, p. 39). 
 
 
Obviously the point Toynbee wants to make is that creative action is just like any 
other action – it consists of an agent, operating in a series of fields or domains, 
selecting possibilities, constrained and enabled by habitus. And it’s certainly 
important to recognise that creative fields are not totally different to other spheres 
of human action, otherwise “some notion of the ineffable power of the artist will 
drift back in” (2000, p. 39). But I don’t think that creative possibility is the same as 
“absence of hindrance” or “rational choice”. “Potential is not … an ability to add on 
to something that is” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 15). Rather it refers to a transformation. 
Questions of choice ultimately go back to the idea of free will, which is usually 
discussed in terms of the relation between agent and structure – each influence 
each other. Obviously the more can be known about the agent and structure the 
more likely we can predict what will happen, but ironically this sets us on the path of 
determinism – if we could know everything, it suggests, everything could be 
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predicted. But choice is not merely an oscillation between two possibilities. The 
possibilities do not actually exist -­­ they are abstracted in mental space as fixed 
points, which the ego “chooses” between, but what is real according to Bergson is 
the evolution of the mental state, which changes constantly (after all if it did not 
change, how could one come to a decision?) (Bergson, 2001, pp. 175-­­176). Hence he 
sees not fixed points, but many tendencies of a “self which lives and develops by 
means of its very hesitations...” the continuous living activity of the self (2001, p. 
176). Choice is a dynamic process. 
 
Bergson and Deleuze see philosophy, art and science not as bodies of knowledge but 
as creative activities – as the creation of problems, that is the correct framing of 
questions, and the avoidance of false problems caused by mixing different modes of 
knowledge. They argue that questions, just like answers, can be true or false, and 
decry the standard academic model in which teachers ask questions and students 
answer. Rather they would apply the test of true and false to problems: “True 
freedom lies in a power… to constitute problems themselves” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 15). 
To refer to an inversion that is typical of Bergson’s thinking – problems and solutions 
are like possibility and reality -­­ there is more in the problem than there is in the 
solution. The correct posing of the problem is the creative act. 
 
A standard question used at my institution is “what are the techniques, conventions 
and practices of genre X, and how can these be used to create new work?” This kind 
of question clearly refers to a systems model of creativity -­­ it implies that new work  
is simply a recombination or revoicing of existing elements. According to Bergson, 
such a problem is based on a faulty premise – the creation of novelty is taken for 
granted. It reifies at least two errors – “mistaking the more for the less” -­­ reducing 
the creative act to a series of pre-­­existent possibilities (the techniques, conventions, 
etc.) when Bergson argues that the possibilities are created by the creative act, not 
the other way round. Alternatively the question contains another kind of error – 
what Bergson calls a badly analysed composite which arbitrarily groups together 
things that differ in kind. The idea of conventions and techniques is clearly spatial, 
that of novelty relates to duration. The new is reduced to a quantity – ie with the 
new work, there will be now more, where there was previously less. The new is like a 
brick, added to an existing pile, but there is very little in this situation that could be 
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